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Abstract
We consider the design of an optimal voting system when voting
is costly. For a private values model with two alternatives we show
the optimality of a voting system that combines three elements: (i)
there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and non-participation is
interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential;
(iii) not all voters are invited to participate in the vote. We show the
optimality of such a voting system by first arguing that it is first best,
that is, it maximizes welfare when incentive compatibility constraints
are ignored, and then showing that individual incentives and social
welfare are sufficiently aligned to make the first best system incentive
compatible. The analysis in this paper involves some methods that
are new to the theory of mechanism design, and it is also a purpose
of this paper to explore these new methods.
∗This paper supersedes a previous draft entitled “Dynamic Mechanism Design with
Costly Participation.” We are grateful to Arthur Lupia, Romans Pancs, Alessandro Pa-
van, Marek Pycia, Ilya Segal, and Ricky Vohra for helpful comments. Tilman Bo¨rgers
thanks the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at
Northwestern University for the hospitality that it offered while he was working on this
paper. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn thanks the Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics
in Bonn for its hospitality, which he enjoyed while working on this paper.
†Department of Economics, UCLA, kbognar@umich.edu.
‡Department of Economics, University of Michigan, tborgers@umich.edu.
§Department of Economics, UCLA, mtv@econ.ucla.edu.
1 Introduction
When participation in votes is costly, and welfare is defined to include the cost
of participation, then the design of an expected welfare-maximizing voting
system must trade off the expected welfare loss that results from sub-optimal
decisions against the expected cost of voting. In this paper, we examine this
tradeoff, and determine a voting system that resolves the tradeoff optimally.
For this optimal voting system we also show that individual voters’ partic-
ipation incentives are sufficiently aligned with the social welfare objective
to make the optimal voting system incentive compatible. The analysis pre-
sented in this paper involves some methods that are new to the theory of
mechanism design. It is also a purpose of this paper to explore these new
methods.
We consider the following setting. A set of voters has to choose one
candidate from a set of two possible candidates for a public office. Each voter
has a strict preference over candidates, and knows his or her own preference,
but not other voters’ preferences. Voters’ preferences are independent, and
each voter is equally likely to prefer either candidate. Participation in the
voting procedure has a known positive cost that is common to all voters.
The system that we find to be optimal declares arbitrarily one of the two
candidates to be the default candidate. Voters are asked sequentially whether
they want to participate in the voting procedure or abstain. A voter who
abstains incurs no participation cost. Non-participation is counted as a vote
in favor of the default candidate. A voter who participates incurs the cost
of voting, and is automatically counted as a vote against the default. The
candidate who receives the majority of votes is elected. Ties can be broken
arbitrarily. The process is terminated at the latest when a majority has been
established that cannot be overturned by the remaining voters. The process
may be terminated earlier.
The optimal procedure thus combines three features of voting procedures,
all of which one observes in practice, although not always together. The first
feature, the use of an arbitrarily chosen default candidate, is reminiscent
of a department chair informing department members that she will take
one particular course of action unless a majority of members objects. The
second feature is that voting is sequential so that voters who come late in the
sequence can form an assessment of the likelihood that their vote is pivotal
based on earlier votes. This is reminiscent of members of the US congress
1
watching roll-call votes on a screen in their offices, and basing the decision
whether to leave their offices and to enter the chamber on the votes of those
who come before them. The third feature of the optimal voting system
is that participation may be artificially constrained, so that some voters
are prevented from participating even if they want to. This is reminiscent
of the formation of executive committees for decision making. All three
features of voting systems may also in practice be motivated by voting cost
considerations.
An important assumption on which our construction is based is that
voters can observe the actions of other voters without incurring participation
cost. Observation only requires watching a TV or computer screen, which is
essentially costless, whereas participation requires actual presence in a room.
We also assume that the participation cost is independent of the mechanism.
In some contexts different assumptions about exogenous participation cost
will be more appropriate. Participation costs may depend on the mechanism.
They may also depend on the extent to which an agent observes actions by
other agents before participating. Finally, in some contexts it may make sense
to consider a mechanism designer who can subsidize voters’ participation
cost. All this is ruled out in our model. Our model is thus special, but the
set-up that we choose yields results that seem realistic in the voting context.
Our study is also of methodological interest because it would not be
sufficient in our set-up to consider static games, i.e. games in which all
players choose simultaneously. Rather we have to consider extensive games
with sequences of moves and non-trivial information sets. Formally, the
choice set of the designer of the voting system in this paper will be the
set of all finite extensive game forms with endogenous participation choices.
Choosing optimally from this set is a much more complex problem than
choosing the optimal mechanism from static games, which is traditionally
considered in mechanism design, where in addition typically one can assume
that the agents’ message spaces are identical to their type spaces.1
The same issue arises in a recent paper by Gershkov and Szentes (2009).
They, too, study the optimal design of a voting scheme. However, whereas we
consider a private value setting, they consider a setting with common values.
While in our setting participation is costly, in their setting information ac-
quisition is costly. As is the case in our paper, they cannot restrict attention
1We explain in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 below why the consideration of static revelation
games is not useful for our analysis.
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to static revelation games but instead need to consider all extensive games.
Their paper therefore deals with a similar methodological issue as ours.
It is interesting to compare Gershkov and Szentes’ analytical approach to
ours. We proceed by first identifying a canonical class of mechanisms to which
we can restrict attention. We then show that within this class the mecha-
nisms that maximize ex ante expected welfare when incentive constraints are
relaxed, i.e. “first best” mechanisms, are also incentive compatible. Ger-
shkov and Szentes, too, find a class of canonical mechanisms to which they
can restrict attention, and then optimize within this class. However, first-
best mechanisms are not incentive compatible in their setting.
The reason why the difference between private and social interests has
more severe consequences in Gershkov and Szentes’ setting than in ours is
that in our set-up, by interpreting non-participation as a signal, the mecha-
nism designer can effectively choose which action is costly, and which action
is free. So, in particular, he can always make whatever action has positive
expected externalities freely available to agents. Therefore, if in the first best
mechanism the mechanism designer asks an agent to take a costly action, we
can conclude that asking the agent to take this action is not based on the
positive externalities of this action, but on the benefits that the mechanism
designer expects to accrue to this particular agent. The agent will therefore
also find that it is in his interest to take the costly action, and the mechanism
designer’s request will be incentive compatible.
In Gershkov and Szentes’ set-up, by contrast, the costs of actions are in-
trinsic to those actions. They cannot be chosen by the mechanism designer.
If information acquisition has positive externalities, then the mechanism de-
signer does not have any way of making information acquisition free. If the
mechanism designer in the first best mechanism asks an agent to acquire in-
formation, this request may well be based on the positive externalities from
information acquisition rather than on that agent’s own interests. The re-
quest may therefore not be incentive compatible.
Gershkov and Szentes’ canonical mechanisms provide minimal informa-
tion to voters to relax voters’ incentive constraints. Even with this construc-
tion, they do not obtain incentive compatibility of the first best mechanism.
By contrast, we consider mechanisms in which all information about previ-
ous votes is revealed to agents and show that even though such a mechanism
maximizes the opportunities for deviations, the optimal canonical mecha-
nism is incentive compatible. We view this maximal informativeness as an
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attractive feature of our mechanism because in practice it may be difficult to
conceal information from voters.
Some authors have considered welfare properties of particular voting
schemes either in a private or in a common value setting, without exam-
ining the general mechanism design problem. For example, Bo¨rgers (2004)
showed in a model similar to ours the superiority of voluntary voting partic-
ipation over required voting participation when voting is costly. Ghosal and
Lockwood (2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2009) describe models in which the
opposite conclusion can be reached. Gershkov and Szentes (2009) reference a
number of papers that study particular voting institutions, and in which the
emphasis is not on participation cost but on information acquisition cost.
Issues analogous to the ones investigated in this paper arise in other mech-
anism design problems whenever participation is costly and it is possible that
participants observe other players’ actions without incurring all participa-
tion cost. Procurement auctions seem a realistic example. Participants in
procurement auctions might first observe the participation decision of other
bidders before incurring the cost of preparing their own bidding material.
The existing literature has studied auction design problems in the case in
which all participation decisions have to be made simultaneously. Examples
of relevant papers are Stegeman (1996) who considers welfare maximizing
auction design in this environment, and Celik and Yilankaya (2009), who
consider profit maximizing auction design. Our paper indicates how one can
set up the auction designer’s problem if one wants to consider the possibil-
ity of reducing participation cost, or perhaps of encouraging participation,
through sequential participation decisions.2
Considering information acquisition cost rather than participation cost,
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) find for a general environment with transfer-
able utility that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms provide socially optimal
incentives for information acquisition when agents have independent private
values. Our main result is similar in that it also proves the incentive compat-
ibility of a first best solution, but the underlying intuition is different: the
transfer payments in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism induce perfectly
aligned individual and social incentives, whereas in our setting individual
and social incentives potentially diverge, yet equilibrium participation deci-
sions are socially optimal. Further results in the literature on information
2Celik and Yilankaya (2009, p. 3) note that dynamic mechanisms might be of advantage
in their setting.
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acquisition in environments with transferable utility are surveyed in Berge-
mann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006). A recent paper by Pancs (2010) considers a
setting with two potential buyers of a single, indivisible object, and finds a
sequential mechanism with partial information disclosure to be maximizing
the expected value of a weighted average of welfare and revenue. This pa-
per is related to our work because it also considers an optimization problem
where the objects among which the mechanism designer chooses are extensive
game forms.
A different type of cost, communication cost, are considered in Fadel and
Segal (2009). The communication cost of a decision rule equals the minimal
number of bits of information agents must transmit in an incentive compat-
ible mechanism that computes this decision rule. Our participation cost can
be interpreted as a fixed cost of communication, whereas Fadel and Segal’s
communication costs are proportional to the number of bits communicated.
Fadel and Segal fix a decision rule and study the minimal communication
costs to implement it. By contrast, we also study the tradeoff between sub-
optimal decisions and participation costs.
We present our framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we state and prove
the main result. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Set-Up
There are n ∈ N voters. We denote the voters by: i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The voters have to pick one of two candidates: k ∈ {A,B}. Each voter i ∈ N
has a type θi ∈ {A,B}. The type of voter i indicates which candidate voter
i prefers. Types are random, and different voters’ types are independent.
Each voter is equally likely to prefer candidate A and candidate B. Each
voter observes his or her own type, but not the other voters’ types. Voter i’s
Bernoulli utility equals 1−c if i’s preferred candidate wins and i participated
in the decision process, −c if i’s preferred candidate loses and i participated
in the decision process, 1 if i’s preferred candidate wins and i did not partic-
ipate in the decision process, and 0 if i’s preferred candidate loses and i did
not participate in the decision process. Here, c > 0 is a constant, the cost of
participation in the decision making process. The distribution of types, what
each voter observes, the Bernoulli utility function, and the value of c are com-
mon knowledge among voters and the mechanism designer. The mechanism
designer does not observe any voter’s type. The mechanism designer seeks
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to maximize the sum of all voters’ ex ante expected utilities.
The setting described so far is obviously very special. We study this sim-
ple setting to focus on methodological issues without distraction and because
elementary modifications of the set-up make the question that we examine
analytically significantly harder, as we explain in the last section of the pa-
per. As anticipated in the Introduction, despite its simplicity, the setting
that we study yields results that are of some real world plausibility.
The mechanism designer chooses firstly an extensive game form that the
voters then use to pick one of the two candidates, and secondly a sequential
equilibrium of the game implied by the game form, the voters’ Bernoulli
utilities, and the voters’ information structure. It is assumed that the voters
play the sequential equilibrium that the mechanism designer chooses.
We begin by describing the set of extensive game forms that the mecha-
nism designer can choose from. We have adapted the following definition of
extensive game forms from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, pp. 200-201).
Definition 1. An extensive game form consists of:
1. The set N of players (identical to the set of voters).
2. A finite set H of finite sequences with the following properties:
(a) The empty sequence ∅ is an element of H;
(b) If
(
ak
)
k=1,...,K
∈ H and L < K then (ak)
k=1,...,L
∈ H.
(Each element of H is a history, or, equivalently, a node. Each com-
ponent of a history is an action taken by a player, or a chance move.
A history
(
ak
)
k=1,...,K
∈ H is terminal if there is no aK+1 such that
(ak)k=1,...,K+1 ∈ H. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. The
set of actions available after a nonterminal history h ∈ H \Z is denoted
by A(h) ≡ {a : (h; a) ∈ H}.)
3. A function P that assigns to each nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Z
an element of N ∪ {C}. (P is the player function, P (h) being the
player who takes an action after history h. If P (h) = C then chance
determines the action taken after history h.)
4. A function fC that associates with every history h for which P (h) = C
a probability measure fC(·|h) on A(h). (fC(a|h) is the probability that
a occurs after history h.)
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5. For each player i ∈ N a partition Ii of {h ∈ H : P (h) = i} with the
property that A(h) = A(h′) whenever h and h′ are in the same element
of the partition. (Ii is the information partition of player i. Any set
Ii ∈ Ii is an information set of player i.)
6. A function D that assigns to each terminal history h ∈ Z a decision
D(h) ∈ [0, 1]. (D(h) as the probability that A is chosen after history
h. Candidate B is chosen with the remaining probability 1−D(h). We
also write D(h) = A if D(h) = 1, and D(h) = B if D(h) = 0.)
We next single out particular extensive game forms, namely those that can
be interpreted as decision making procedures that include voters’ decisions
about participation in the procedure. We call such extensive game forms
mechanisms with participation decisions.
Definition 2. An extensive game form is a mechanism with participation
decisions if:
1. For every nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Z we either have:
(a) P (h) ∈ N and A(h) ⊆ {0, 1}, or
(b) A(h) ∩ {0, 1} = ∅.
(Histories that satisfy (a) will be called participation nodes of player
P (h). For such histories we interpret the action 1 as participation by
voter P (h), and the action 0 as non-participation by voter P (h).)
2. For every terminal history
(
ak
)
k=1,...,K
∈ Z and every i ∈ N we either
have:
(a) if ` < K and P (a1, . . . , a`) = i then a`+1 = 0
or there is a unique L < K such that:
(b) if ` < L and P (a1, . . . , a`) = i then a`+1 = 0;
(c) P (a1, . . . , aL) = i and aL+1 = 1;
(d) if ` > L and P (a1, . . . , a`) = i then a`+1 /∈ {0, 1}.
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(Either player i does not participate in this terminal history, or he
participates at the L+1st action node of the history. In the latter case,
all of i’s earlier action nodes are participation nodes at which i does not
participate, but none of the later action nodes are participation nodes.
This definition implies that before doing anything else players have to
choose to participate.)
For every mechanism with participation decisions there is an associated
game of incomplete information in which voters first learn privately their
types, and then play the mechanism. Voters evaluate outcomes according
to their Bernoulli utility function. The cost c is incurred by a player i if
and only if a participation history of that player i has been reached and the
player made the choice to participate, that is, chose action 1 at that point.
We denote strategies of player i by σi. The solution concept that we shall
use is sequential equilibrium. The mechanism designer’s problem is then as
follows:
The Mechanism Designer’s Problem. Choose a mechanism with partic-
ipation decisions m and a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) for the incomplete
information game associated with m to maximize the sum of ex ante expected
utilities of all voters, subject to the constraint that σ is a sequential equilib-
rium of the incomplete information game associated with m.
3 Result
Proposition 1. A solution (m,σ) to the mechanism designer’s problem ex-
ists. Moreover, there is at least one solution with the following properties:
(i) There is no h ∈ H \ Z such that P (h) = C. (There are no chance
moves.)
(ii) For every i ∈ N and every Ii ∈ Ii: #Ii = 1. (The extensive game form
is of perfect information.)
(iii) For every h = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ Z and every i ∈ N there is at most one
` < K such that P (a1, . . . , a`) = i. Moreover then: A(a1, . . . , a`) =
{0, 1}. (Every voter makes at most one decision. This decision is a
participation decision. Participation is voluntary.)
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(iv) There is an x ∈ {A,B} such that for every h = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ Z:
D(h) = x if #{k|ak = 1} < K/2, and D(h) 6= x if #{k|ak = 1} > K/2.
(Candidate x is the default candidate. If a majority of voters who
make a choice decide not to participate, then x is chosen. If a majority
of voters who make a choice decide to participate, then the default is
overturned.)
(v) If P (h) = i and A(h) = {0, 1}, then σ(h, θi) = 1 if and only if θi 6= x.
(A voter participates if and only if she opposes the default.)
(vi) If h = (a1, . . . , aK) is such that #{k|ak = 0} ≥ n/2 or #{k|ak = 1} ≥
n/2 then h ∈ Z. (The decision process ends at the latest when a ma-
jority of potential voters has indicated a preference for one candidate.)
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 has two parts. In the first part we consider
a relaxed version of the mechanism designer’s problem in which the constraint
that σ has to be a sequential equilibrium is dropped. We show that a pair
(m∗, σ∗) exists that solves the relaxed problem, and that has the properties
described in Proposition 1. In the second part of the proof we show for
any solution (m∗, σ∗) that has the properties described in Proposition 1 that
σ∗ is indeed a sequential equilibrium of the extensive game with incomplete
information corresponding to m∗. Therefore such a solution of the relaxed
maximization problem is also a solution of the mechanism designer’s problem.
Part 1. We consider the relaxed maximization problem. Let m be any
mechanism with participation decisions, and let σ be a strategy combina-
tion for the corresponding extensive game with incomplete information. We
shall explain how one can transform m into a mechanism with participation
decisions mˆ, and σ into a strategy combination σˆ for the extensive game
with incomplete information corresponding to mˆ, such that (mˆ, σˆ) have the
properties described in Proposition 1, and expected welfare resulting from
(mˆ, σˆ) is at least as large as expected welfare from (m,σ). Existence of an
optimal solution with the properties described in Proposition 1 then follows
immediately, as there are only finitely many mechanisms and strategy com-
binations with the properties described in Proposition 1. One of them needs
to be optimal.
We now describe the transformation. If m has information sets with
multiple elements, we begin by modifying m so that all information sets are
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singletons. We adjust σ so that each player’s strategy assigns to every non-
terminal history at which a player moves in the new extensive game form the
same action that σ assigned previously to that history. In this step we thus
provide players with additional information, but assume that they do not
make use of this additional information. This step leaves expected welfare
unchanged.
Next, if either there are chance moves in the extensive game form, or the
decision rule D of the extensive game form involves randomization, or if the
strategies σ involve any randomization, we consider the set of combinations of
actions by the chance player C, non-randomized decision rules D, and pure
strategies σ that are assigned positive probability, and we pick from this
(finite) set one combination that yields highest expected welfare. We then
replace the chance moves, decision rule and the strategies by this combination
of non-randomized rules. This step either leaves expected welfare unchanged,
or increases it. We next remove all actions that are not taken according to σ,
and we remove all nodes corresponding to chance player C. This step leaves
expected welfare unchanged.
We now pick one of the two candidates, denoted by x, as the “default
candidate.” We denote the other candidate by y. It does not matter which
candidate we pick to be the default candidate. Proceeding in an arbitrary
order of players, we then successively for each player i make the following
changes to the extensive game form: We first consider the earliest nodes h
at which player i moves. These must be participation nodes. If one type
of player i participates at h, and another one does not participate, then we
label the choice that type θi = x makes as “0” (i.e. don’t participate), and
the choice that type θi = y makes as “1” (i.e. participate). If the game
tree that follows the choice 0 contains further choices of player i, then we
remove the choices that type θi = y would have made at those nodes, and
then we remove these nodes from the game tree. Similarly, if the game tree
that follows the choice 1 contains further choices of player i, then we remove
the choices that type θi = x would have made at those nodes, and then we
remove these nodes from the game tree. If both types of player i participate
at h, then we remove h from the game tree, assuming that player i does
not participate at this history, and label the next decision nodes of player i
as participation nodes. If both types of player i don’t participate at h, we
remove h from the game tree, assuming that player i does not participate at
this node. We iterate this operation for player i until there are no further
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nodes left to consider. Then we proceed to the next player until there are no
further players left to consider.
This step either leaves expected welfare unchanged or it increases it. This
is because we don’t change for each vector of realized types of all voters
the candidate chosen. Moreover, in each step, if at the node that we are
considering exactly one type of a player participates, then we don’t change
the expected participation cost or we reduce them. We may have switched
which type participates, but because both types are equally likely, and both
types have the same participation cost, this is inconsequential. Moreover,
for the type that does not participate, we have fixed that this type does
not participate at future nodes either. This potentially reduces expected
participation cost. If both types participate then we have clearly either left
participation cost unchanged, or reduced them. Moreover, if both types
did not participate at the node that we were considering then we have left
participation cost unchanged.
Our next step is to modify the candidate chosen after each history to be
the candidate to maximize expected welfare conditional on the information
revealed by the voters’ choices. This obviously requires that the candidate is
chosen who is preferred by the majority of players who have made a choice,
where we count non-participation as an expression of a preference for x, and
participation as an expression of a preference for y.
The final step is to remove all decision nodes that don’t affect the final
decision, starting at the end of the game tree and moving iteratively to
the beginning. This step leaves the collective decision unchanged, and either
leaves expected participation cost unchanged or reduces them. After this step
we have obtained a mechanism with participation decisions, and a strategy
vector for the extensive game with incomplete information corresponding to
this mechanism, which have all the properties described in Proposition 1.
Part 2. Let (m∗, σ∗) be a combination of mechanism with participation
decisions and strategy vector that has the properties described in Proposi-
tion 1, and that maximizes expected welfare among all such combinations.
We now show that σ∗ is a sequential equilibrium of the incomplete infor-
mation game corresponding to m∗. We first note that all information sets
in the extensive game with incomplete information corresponding to m∗ are
reached with positive probability. Therefore, beliefs are given by Bayesian
updating. The strategies form a sequential equilibrium if and only if they
are sequentially rational given these beliefs.
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Consider any information set. Let i be the voter choosing at that infor-
mation set. Denote by ∆ the difference between the probability of the default
candidate x winning if voter i abstains and the probability of the default can-
didate winning if voter i participates. We calculate these two probabilities
conditional on the information set that we are considering. The prescribed
actions of the two types of voter i at this information set are sequentially
rational if and only if:
∆ ≥ c. (1)
To see this note that for voter i the benefits from not-participating are ∆
and the cost is zero if he prefers the default candidate, and the gains from
participating are ∆ and the cost of participating are c if he opposes the
default candidate. The benefits are at least as large as the costs in both
cases if and only if (1) is true.
We derive (1) from the fact that the given mechanism and strategy com-
bination maximize expected welfare. Let z1 and z2 both be elements of the
set of candidates {A,B}. Denote by “wz1z2” expected welfare conditional
on the decision node that we are considering, conditional on voter i being
type z1, and conditional on voter i choosing at the decision node the action
that the strategy σ∗ prescribes for the case that voter i is of type z2. Here,
we calculate expected welfare taking everything into account except voter i’s
participation cost. We obtain four numbers: wxx, wxy, wyx, wyy, where x is
the default candidate, and y is the other candidate.
The expected welfare optimality of the strategy that we are considering
implies that expected welfare is at least as large when voter i’s types take
the actions prescribed as it is when the two types of voter i take the same
action. Note that when the two types take the same action then the mecha-
nism designer can label that action “non-participation,” and thus incur zero
participation cost for voter i. By contrast, if the two types take opposite
actions, then with probability 0.5 the mechanism designer incurs cost of c.
This implies the following two inequalities:
0.5wxx + 0.5wyy − 0.5c ≥ 0.5wxx + 0.5wyx, (2)
0.5wxx + 0.5wyy − 0.5c ≥ 0.5wxy + 0.5wyy. (3)
These two inequalities are equivalent to:
wyy − wyx ≥ c, (4)
wxx − wxy ≥ c. (5)
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Now we decompose the expected welfare differences on the left hand sides
of these inequalities into differences in voter i’s expected welfare, and differ-
ences in all other voters’ expected welfare. Denote all other voters’ expected
welfare by w−iz if voter i chooses the action that is prescribed for the case
that he favors candidate z. Note that this expected welfare does not depend
on voter i’s true preference. Using this notation we can re-write the above
inequalities as:
∆ + w−iy − w−ix ≥ c (6)
∆ + w−ix − w−iy ≥ c (7)
or, equivalently, as:
∆ ≥ c+ (w−ix − w−iy ) (8)
∆ ≥ c− (w−ix − w−iy ) (9)
The expression
(
w−ix − w−iy
)
must be positive, zero, or negative. In either
case, one of the last two inequalities implies (1).
4 Discussion
4.1 Sub-optimality of Static Mechanisms
Proposition 1 describes features that at least one optimal pair of mechanism
and its equilibrium have. The result does not assert that all optimal pairs of
mechanisms and their corresponding equilibria have these features. We argue
in this subsection that when n is at least 3 and the voting cost c is sufficiently
small no optimal mechanism will be static. Here, we call a mechanism with
participation decisions static if all moves, including participation decisions,
are made simultaneously.
We begin with the observation that a static mechanism with participation
decisions and its equilibrium cannot be optimal if in equilibrium there is a
positive probability that at least n/2 + 1 (if n is even) or n/2 + 1.5 (if n is
odd) voters participate. This is an implication of the fact that the procedure
described in part 1 of the proof of Proposition 1, when applied to such a
static mechanism and its equilibrium, strictly increases expected welfare. It
strictly increases expected welfare because it allows voting to be terminated
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when sufficiently many agents have participated to establish a majority which
cannot be overturned. This economizes on voting cost.
Now suppose that voting cost c are sufficiently small, and that there are
at least 3 voters. Then it is easy to see that the mechanism designer, if re-
stricted to a static mechanism, will choose a mechanism and a corresponding
equilibrium where there is a positive probability that more voters than given
by the above thresholds participate.3 Therefore, no optimal mechanism is
static if n is at least 3 and the voting cost c are sufficiently small.
4.2 The Revelation Principle
We have not used the revelation principle in our analysis, although this prin-
ciple plays a central role in many studies of mechanism design problems.
The revelation principle, applied to our model, says that for any sequential
equilibrium of a mechanism with participation decisions one can construct a
direct mechanism in which voters reveal their type to the mechanism designer
who then implements the outcome that would have resulted in the original
mechanism if the voters had played their equilibrium strategies. Moreover, in
this direct mechanism, all voters reporting their types truthfully is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, that is, the direct mechanism is incentive compatible. In
our context, the outcome that the mechanism designer implements once types
have been revealed consists of a selection of one of the two candidates, and
also participation decisions for each voter. Reporting one’s type in the direct
mechanism is costless. A voter incurs participation cost only when the direct
mechanism’s outcome specifies that the voter participates. With this notion
of a direct mechanism, the standard proof of the revelation principle can be
used to prove the revelation principle also for our model.
Note that the direct mechanisms described in the previous paragraph are
not mechanisms with participation decisions in the sense of Definition 2. Ac-
cording to Definition 2 an agent has to incur participation cost before taking
any other action. In particular, in Definition 2, reporting one’s type is not
possible without incurring participation cost. When solving the mechanism
designer’s problem, we cannot therefore proceed in the usual way and max-
imize expected welfare among all incentive compatible direct mechanisms,
and then conclude that the optimal direct mechanism is also a solution to
3We omit the formal proof of this assertion.
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the mechanism designer’s original problem. Direct mechanisms are not in
the feasible set of the mechanism designer’s original problem.
One might try instead to first maximize expected welfare among all incen-
tive compatible direct mechanisms that are equivalent4 to some mechanism
with participation decisions and a corresponding sequential equilibrium, re-
constructing the underlying mechanism with participation decisions and its
sequential equilibrium only in a second step. However, there is no obvi-
ous characterization of the incentive compatible direct mechanisms that the
designer can choose from. Clearly, not all incentive compatible direct mech-
anisms can be allowed. For example, any direct mechanism where no voter
ever participates, yet the collective decision depends on voters’ types, must be
ruled out. Which restrictions exactly describe the admissible set of incentive
compatible direct mechanisms seems difficult to determine.
A possibly more useful version of the revelation principle in our model
considers mechanisms with participation decisions where any voter who has
decided to participate reports her type subsequently, and then does not get
to move again.5 One might call such mechanisms direct mechanisms with
participation decisions. The standard logic of the revelation principle implies
that for every mechanism with participation decisions, and corresponding
sequential equilibrium, there is an equivalent direct mechanism with par-
ticipation decisions and a sequential equilibrium such that any voter who
is asked to reveal his type reveals that type truthfully. This result is true
in more general models than ours, and in such more general models may
simplify the search for optimal mechanisms. In our model there is no need
for participating voters to reveal their types because the types can be in-
ferred from the participation decision. Therefore, our analysis in this paper
seems best conducted without explicit appeal to this version of the revelation
principle.
4We call a direct mechanism “equivalent” to a mechanism with participation decisions
and a corresponding sequential equilibrium if in this sequential equilibrium for every vector
of voters’ types, the same candidate is chosen, and the same voters participate, as in the
direct mechanism if voters reveal their types truthfully in that mechanism.
5This revelation principle is related to the revelation principle invoked in Myerson
(1986) where players in a multi-stage mechanism report in each period their privately
observed information to the mechanism designer. However, participation decisions play
no role in Myerson’s set-up, and the rationale for reporting private information not initially
but later is in Myerson’s paper not that a player did not participate earlier, but that the
information was not available to the player at an earlier stage.
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4.3 Correlated Types
A natural extension of our model is a model in which agents’ types are
correlated. For concreteness suppose there are two equally likely possible
states of the world, a and b, where conditional on state a individual voters’
preferences are i.i.d. with the probability that a voter prefers candidate
A being p > 0.5 and conditional on state b individual voters’ preferences
are i.i.d. with the probability that a voter prefers candidate B being p.
Voters observe the state and their own preferences. This structure is common
knowledge.
If the mechanism designer does not observe the state of the world before
designing the mechanism, then, unlike in our setting, it may be that no first
best mechanism is incentive compatible. To see this suppose for simplicity
that preferences are perfectly correlated, i.e. p = 1. Then any first best
mechanism will invite at most one voter to participate. Non-participation
will be interpreted as a preference for one candidate, and participation will
be interpreted as a preference for the other candidate. This one voter’s
preference will determine the collective choice. However, this one voter’s
individual incentives to participate do not reflect the positive externality
that he exerts on other voters, and therefore he may individually prefer not
to participate even if the first best mechanism requires him to participate.6
If the mechanism designer does observe the state of the world before
designing the mechanism, then the first best mechanism can be analyzed as
in this paper except that the choice of default candidate is no longer arbitrary,
but the candidate who is more likely to be preferred by voters must be made
the default candidate. A difficulty is that the argument of this paper for
incentive compatibility of the first best mechanism no longer applies. The
intuition is not obvious from the proof that we presented in Section 3. It
is as follows: When constructing the first best mechanism in the case that
both candidates are equally likely to be preferred, the mechanism designer
is at every information set indifferent between labeling either of the two
actions available to an agent as “non-participation,” and thereby making it
available for free. Therefore, in particular, even if in our construction he
6Note the analogy with the analysis of Gershkov and Szentes (2009) that we cited in
the Introduction. In their paper, too, first best mechanisms are not incentive compatible
because information acquisition by one voter exerts a positive externality on other voters,
and therefore individual incentives for information acquisition need not be as large as the
social benefit from information acquisition.
16
doesn’t do so, the mechanism designer could have labelled the action with
positive externalities as free, and his request to the agent to sometimes take
the costly action reveals that the participation cost are not larger than the
benefits accruing to this agent. This implies incentive compatibility of the
first best mechanism. But if the voters’ types are not equally likely, then
the mechanism designer is no longer indifferent between labeling either of
the two actions as “non-participation.” He will always want to label that
action as “participation” that the less likely type takes. This action might
have positive externalities. The mechanism designer’s request to the agent to
take the costly action may be based in parts on such a positive externality of
that action. The agent’s individual incentives need not be sufficient to cover
the cost of participation. The first best mechanism need not be incentive
compatible. This case thus requires a separate analysis.
4.4 Privately Observed Voting Costs
Another modification of our model assumes that not only voters’ preferences
but also their voting cost c are privately observed random variables. The rea-
son why the analysis of Section 3 does not apply to this modified model is as
follows. When analyzing the incentive issues raised in the second part of the
proof we may find that voters with large voting cost who oppose the default
have an incentive to participate even if the mechanism designer prefers them
not to participate. For voters who oppose the default the argument in the
second part of our proof shows that their individual incentives to participate
are at least as large as c whenever the designer wants them to participate.
But the argument allows the possibility that the individual incentives are
strictly larger than c. Thus, when the planner’s first best mechanism re-
quests a voter to abstain when her cost realization is high, the voter may
find it privately beneficial to mimic a low cost type and participate any-
way. If c is privately observed the planner cannot prevent her from doing so.
Therefore, this modification of our model, too, requires a separate analysis.
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